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NOTES
courts would recognize assertions concerning the purpose of a trip
as a declaration of a mental state acceptable in evidence as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. No other or better evidence may be ex-
pected to show the invisible phases of another's mind. Further, it
may well be argued that if the declarant announced an intention, he
probably carried it out. It is the intent that is material and this is so
whether it accompanies an act or not." Statements of pain or of
physical state are readily admitted,' and there is no reason why the
admission of declarations of mental states, intent, design, or plan
should not be put upon the same basis.
E.G.
INSURANCE
RISK OF Loss BETWEEN VENDOR AND PURCHASER-
INSURANCE SHOULD RUN VITH THE LAND
The plaintiff was the owner of certain real estate in Ohio and de-
fendants were the owners of a lot with a bungalow thereon situated
in Florida. They entered into a valid written contract to exchange
their properties. A deed was executed and delivered by plaintiff con-
veying its property to defendants and they transferred the Florida
property to plaintiff. Thereafter it developed that prior to the exec-
tion and delivery of deeds but subsequent to the contract of ex-
change, the Florida bungalow was destroyed by fire. The court held
that in the absence of stipulation as to who should bear the loss, the
purchaser must be regarded as the equitable owner of the property,
and loss by reason of fire destroying the building before execution
of the deed fell on him.'
It is undoubtedly true that the majority of courts have adopted
the view that, where a contract is made to convey real estate upon
which a building stands, the burden of loss by the destruction of the
building without fault of either party falls upon the vendee.' The
u Statt: v. Long, 32 DLk. 380, 123 Atl. 350 (1923).
2 People v. Hauke, 335 I1. 217, 167 N. E. 1, (1929); Commonwealth v. Gangi, 243
Mos. 341, 137 \. E. 643 (1923); People v. Perrin, 224 App. Div. 546, 231 N. Y. Supp.
557 (1928); affirmed in 251 N. Y. 509, 168 N. E. 407 (1929).
1 Oak Building and Roofing Co. v. Susor et al., 32 Ohio App. 66, 166 N. E. 908 (1929).
2Hough v. City Fire Insurance Co., 29 Conn. 10 (1860); Davidson v. Hawkeye
Insurance Co., 71 Iowa 532, 32 N. W. 514 (1887); Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Ad. 301 (1868);
M[arion v. Wolcott, 68 N. J. Eq. 20, 59 Ad. 242 (1904); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb.
309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921); Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900); see notes
22 A. . R. 575.
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vendee is looked upon and treated as the owner of the land; an equit-
able estate has vested in him and although the vendor remains owner
of the legal title,3 he holds it as a trustee for the vendee, to whom all
the beneficial interest has passed.4  Under this rule equity from the
moment the contract is binding, gives the vendee the entire benefit of
all increment and therefore he should accept the burden of any loss
not due to the vendor's fault.'
A substantial minority view has been established which plaees
the loss on the vendor on the theory that the vendor is unable to per-
form." This is identical with the rule at law and the rule in prac-
tically all jurisdictions in the sale of chattels; it seems to conform
more nearly to common business experience as evidenced by the
stipulations in contracts placing loss on the vendor in almost all in-
stances where the matter is called to the attention of the parties.' It
has been suggested that possession at the time of loss should be an
essential criterion for determining on whom the loss should fall S From
the viewpoint of natural justice, as some law writers express it, and
from a practical viewpoint, the party in possession should be held for
the loss.' However, the majority view is that possession is an un-
essential incident."
Accepting the view that risk of loss falls on the vendee, great con-
fusion in the law results where the vendor has insured the property
'At law" this would make the loss fall on the vendor who cannot perform because
of failure of consideration. Wells v. Calwan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871).
4 1 PoMaoY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th Ed.) sec. 368.
5 Keener, 1 COL. LAW REv. 1, 8; Williston, 9 11tMv. L. Rrv. 106. 113.
0 Thompson v. Gould, 37 Mass. 134 (1838); Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128
N. E. 13 (1920); see comments 19 Micii. L. Rev. 576, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 111; E.SATE-
MSENT, CONTRACTS Vol. 1, Sec. 281; Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. WMS: (Eng.) 217 (1724) Head-
note reads "Against Natural Justice that Anyone Should Pay For a Bargain Which He
Cannot Have."
Vanneman, Risk of Loss B3etween .'cndor and Purchaser, 8 MINNs. L. REv. 127.
'Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. "1 ...... (a) when neither the legal
title nor the possession of the subject matter of the contract has been transferred to the
purchaser, if) all or a material part thereof is destroyed . . . the vendor cannot enforce
the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover any portion of the price paid; . . .
(b) when either the legal title or possession has been transferred to the purchaser; if all
or a material part thereof is destroyed . . . the purchaser is not thereby relieved from a
duty to pay the price . . ." Adopted in Nei, York; REA. PROPERTY LAW, Sec. 240-a; See
Cook, 31 ILL L. REv. 143.
See Justice Dean dissenting in McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74
(1921).
10 O'Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 186 N. W. 440 (1922); In Cwnmnarata v. Merke-
witz, 120 Misc. 503, 198 N. Y. S. 825 (1923), Mr. Justice Rodenbeck states with re-
luctance, "The court is bound to follow this ruling (possession unessential), even If it
does not appeal to one's sense of justice, that a person out of possession or without the
right of possession, with no control over the care of the property, should be obliged to
pay for something the vendor is unable to deliver."
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and fails to make a proper assignment to the vendee. The English
view, followed by a minority of American courts, holds that as be-
tween the purchaser and vendor the latter is entitled to the insur-
ance money" because the vendee is a stranger to the contract, which
does not run with the land.' The sequel to such a holding is that as
between the vendor and the insurance company the latter is entitled to
retain the money because the vendor suffers no loss and where paid
the insurer may recover through the doctrine of subrogation.' The
result reached by the English view seems undesirable because many
a purchaser believing the vendor's insurance to cover his loss, dis-
covers that a strict compliance with legal theory deprives him of his
expected indemnity from the insurer.1
The weight of authority in this country is that the vendor is
entitled to collect the insurance and hold in trust for the vendee as a
substitute for the insured property." While such a holding accom-
plishes a desirable result it must be admitted that the logic used is
somewhat questionable. As long as the fire insurance policy is con-
sidered personal the insurer should only be held to the terms of his
contract. Since the agreement is to indemnify the insured against his
loss, no amount of legal gymnastics can impose on the insurer the
additional burden of indemnifying a stranger to the contract for that
person's loss. However, courts of equity are ever willing to disregard
legalistic reasoning if by so doing the ends of justice are attained.
It is submitted that uniformity on this important matter can be
obtained only by appropriate specific modification of the statutory
standard fire policies." Legislation should be enacted to the effect
U Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 1 (1881), approved by Pound, 33
tsLv. L. REV. 813, 829; White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); Zenor v.
Hayes, 228 I1. 626, 81 N. E. 1144 (1907); 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 909.
'2"Insurance of a building against fire is a personal contract. It is a contract of in-
demnity with the person whose interest in the building is insured, to indemnify him
against loss which he may sustain. It does not pass to the purchaser of the building."
NIcDonald v. Adm'r. of Black. 20 Ohio 185, 192 (1851).
' Castellain v. Preston, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 380 (1883).
' The English Parliament has deemed it wise to enact legislation which allows the
purchassr to have the benefit of the vendor's insurance. Statute 12 & 13 Geo. V., sec.
105. "Any mony " becoming payable after the date of any contract for the sale of
property under any policy of assurance in respect to any damage to or destruction of
property included in such contract shall, on completion of such contract, be held and
receivable by the vendor on behalf of the purchaser and paid by the vendor to the pur-
chaser on completion of the sale or as soon thereafter as the same shall be received by the
vendor."
1 S':inner & Sons Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Ati. 85 (1900); Williams v. Lilley,
67 Coni. 50, 34 At. 765 (1895); Russell v. Elliott, 45 S. D. 184, 186 N1. W,r 824 (1922),
22 A. L. R. 557, Approved in 6 ,MiNN. L. Rav. 607.
11 Simpson, Legi.lat ve Changes b: the Law of Equitable Cnversiant by Contract: II,
44 YA s L. ,. 754, 769-71 (1935).
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that policies of fire insurance shall run with the land'7 and be paid
as interest may appear; where the vendor insures prior to the contract
of sale, such insurance shall continue on the property until expressly
cancelled by the insurer. It is realized that such a provision modify-
ing the statutory forms of insurance policies will be fought strenu-
ously by the insurer in the several state legislatures.' Such opposi-
tion has been encountered and defeated on previous occasions."
Whether it be called convenience, 20 universal consensus of man-
kind,21 business man's viewpoint,2 2 or natural justice, 23 the layman as-
sumes that an executory contract for the sale of insured realty carries
the protection of existing insurance to the purchaser. If that is the
meaning in the market place, that should also be the meaning in the
court room." This can be accomplished most effectively by legisla-
tive enactment.
R. W. C.
JOINT TENANCY
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS-JOINT TENANCY-
SURVIVORSHIP
F, by letter, directed her Building and Loan Association to with-
draw $i8oo.oo from her savings account and deposit it in a separate
account, issuing therefor a certificate of deposit in the names of "F
or S or suvivor," the certificate to be placed in her deposit passbook.
then in the hands of the association; S to be notified of the arrange-
ment only if she survived F. The Ohio Court of Appeals, upon re-
versing the trial court's judgment for the executor, because of con-
flict certified the record to the Supreme Court. Held, affirmed, the
court reasoning that at the moment the company carried out the in-
structions of F, an executed contract arose between the company
and F, enforceable by S with the attendant incident of survivor-
17 Vance, 34 YALr L. J. 87.
18A somewhat similar amendment to the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
was withdrawn for that reason. 44th Annual Meeting National Conference on Uniform
State Laws. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1934.
1Notably incontestible clause in life insurance policies.
$1 RicsARns, INSURANCE (4th Ed.) 1932, sec. 245.
'James dissenting in Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 1 (1881).
2 Vanneman, 3 MiNN. L. REv. 139.
2Ileadnote in Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. WVMS. (Eng.) 217 (1724).
SVance, 34 YALE L. J. 90.
